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"Overlooking Runway 25 - Right, at Los Angeles International Airport"
The Tragic Grounding & Capsize of M/V Costa Concordia
Feature Date: January 13 2012 In Singles Only
Event Date: January 13 2012
M/V Costa Concordia
IMO Number:: 9320544
The Air & Ocean Logistics- Customs Broker & Hull Attorneys
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"Overlooking Runway 25 - Right, at Los Angeles International Airport"
On The Scene -- Off Isola del Giglio, Italy
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REFLECTIONS UOPN A CASUALTY - our expert opinon on the loss of M/V Costa Concordia by Geoffrey W. Gill, Esq.
Maritime Books By Geoffrey W. Gill of Countryman & McDaniel
The Vessel - the luxurious mega cruise ship
The Incident - Jan. 13 2012
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The Date: January 13 2012
The Time: 21:45 Local
The Place: Off Isola del Giglio, Italy
"Costa
Lot" M/V Costa
Concordia IMO Number:
9320544 On The Scene Off
Isola del
Giglio, Italy January
13 2012 M/V Costa
Concordia In
Better Days Name::
M/V
Costa Concordia Owner:
Carnival Corporation & plc Operator:
Costa
Cruises Port of
registry: Genoa,
Italy Route:
Western
Mediterranean Ordered:
19 January 2004 Builder:
Fincantieri
Sestri Ponente, Italy Cost:
¤450 million (£372M, US$570M Yard
number: 6122 Launched:
2 September 2005 Christened:
7 July 2006[2] Acquired
By The Line: 30 June 2006 Maiden
voyage: 14 July 2006 In
service: July 2006 Out of
service: 13 January 2012 Status:
Capsized off Isola
del Giglio, Italy IMO
Number: 9320544 MMSI
Number.: 247158500 Call
sign: IBHD Class & Type:
Concordia
Class Cruise Ship Tonnage:
114,137 GT Length: LOA 290.20 m
(952 ft 1 in) LBP 247.4 m
(811 ft 8 in) Beam: 35.50 m
(116 ft 6 in) Draught: 8.20 m
(26 ft 11 in) Depth: 14.18 m
(46 ft 6 in) Decks: 17 Installed power: 6 x
Wärtsilä
diesel engines, 75,600 kilowatts (101,400 hp) Propulsion: Diesel-electric;
two shafts (2 ? 21 MW) - Two fixed pitch
propellers Speed: Capacity: 3780
passengers Crew: 1,100 PROLOG TO
DISASTER MV
Costa Concordia is
a 114,000 ton ship -- larger than either
RMS
Titanic
or RMS
Queen Mary
-- which has suffered an historic loss of passengers
& property. Cargo
Law
has many unique & relevant details of this major loss
to report to you, but due to our limited staff, our
material will be posted after we complete publication of
The
Cargo Letter
for the month of January 2012, within the next several
days. We
have called our feature "Costa Lot" -- because this may
be the most expensive marine loss of all time -- but no
humor is intended for this tragedy. We
have posted illusrative photos, but please expect our
unique coverage shortly. This feature deals
will still highlight the concept
---"Ship
Happens! ©" The Loss of M/V
Costa Concordia by Geoffrey W.
Gill, Esq. However, for all the shock and
incredulity inspired by the casualty, it was but one of a
number occurring over roughly the past month: on
Christmas Day, the loaded Vietnamese bulk carrier
Vinalines Queen sank in rough weather with the loss of 22
of 23 crewmen; the South Korean tanker Doola No. 3 was
almost split in two by an explosion, with 11 seafarers
missing; and, a bulk carrier and ferry collided off
Morocco, to name but a few. The sea remains a dangerous
place and seafaring a dangerous occupation. Indeed,
maritime insurance data reflect that over a recent
10-year period, claims cost the P&I industry on
average USD 4 million a day, with more than 65% of this
pay-out attributable to incidents in which human error
played a dominant part and, further, the average number
of incidents involving serious or total loss of vessels
over 500 grt had risen steadily over the 15-year period
to 2008. As for Costa Concordia, while much
remains unknown or subject to speculation, what is known
is that this 4,800 person capacity modern passenger liner
struck a rock, part of a charted outcropping, while
engaged in some form of "tourist navigation" allowing her
to be seen by inhibitants of and visitors to the Island
of Giglio off Italy's Tuscan coast. With 17 dead and 16
still missing, this casualty remains subject of a media
feeding frenzy with editorial stigmatization of the
ship's master and speculation as to underlying
circumstances. The following comments rely, in part, upon
analysis provided by g-Captain of AIS information from
the vessel, generalized information from Lloyd's List,
and the comment author's recent book Maritime Error
Management and his many years as a licensed deck officer
and maritime attorney, and only minimally upon coverage
by the popular media. While specific details have yet to
be agreed upon, a fair observation is that the vessel was
much closer to land &endash; certainly to the rock
outcropping &endash; than anyone had intended. The
vessel's owner has stated that a deviation from the
expected voyage passage plan to come close to the island
of Giglio was "unauthorized, unapproved and unknown" to
owner's shoreside management. Perhaps unrelated, there is
evidence that last summer one of the company' passenger
vessels made an authorized "sail by" close by the island,
during which that vessel passed considerably closer than
the minimum 500 meters expected, and perhaps as close as
200 meters to the rock subsequently struck by Costa
Concordia. Perhaps more relevant is evidence that prior
to the casualty voyage, there were several other "sail
bys" of the owner's vessels by the island. To the extent
other formally unauthorized sail bys may have occurred
&endash; recognizing that such events would have been
common knowledge on board within at least the bridge
navigation team &endash; suggests a "normalization of
deviance," where a deviant organizational or shipboard
experience gains a level of acceptance because there is
neither a bad outcome nor punitive response nor peer
disapproval. What may once have been idiosyncratic tends
to become accepted. An example of normalization of
deviance was NASA's Challenger tragedy. Another, perhaps more alarming,
scenario presents if Costa Concordia's captain Shettino
did in fact violate a company rule prohibiting such or
similar deviations [and, in any event, deliberate
sailing so close to a charted outcropping violates
multiple rules of good seamanship]. Deliberate
violation of formal rules, regulations, policies and
procedures [RRPP] is more common than may be
expected. A study of aviation pilots found an approximate
20% of the study pilots violated RRPP (violators being
referred to as "drongos," a species of Australian bird
purportedly noted for regularly defecating upon the heads
of passers-by) while another study of North Sea oil field
workers found a 29.6% rate. Interestingly, violators
violate not usually for personal benefit but rather,
among other factors, generally to benefit their employer.
Not surprisingly, the violation of RRPP is of great
concern within the maritime industry, due in part to the
traditional on board authoritarian command structure as
well as to the geographic remoteness of the vessels and
their personnel from shoreside management. This
remoteness also contributes to frequent erosion of the
ISM Code inspired company safety culture into a vessel
peculiar safety climate. Captain Shettino's actual
motivation for deviating from the original voyage passage
plan is unlikely to be known until there is a Vessel Data
Recorder transcript of the discussions that occurred on
the bridge. However, AIS data from the vessel suggests
the vessel did so deviate. The circumstances of the deviation
and subsequent navigation implicate little-studied
cognitive issues related to maritime watch-standing.
Presumably the decision to approach the island was
announced by captain Shettino, with or without
explanation, to his bridge team then on watch. While he
purportedly claims that navigation close to the island
was "by eye," information has not yet been disclosed
regarding whether or to what extent courses were laid
down on a chart or the scale of such chart. At a minimum,
appropriate Bridge resource Management would have
required timely discussion of the contemplated deviation,
with all relevant aspects carefully and jointly evaluated
by the navigation team. Consideration should have been
given to whether the deviation and its execution was
consistent with prevailing company operating procedures.
Any dissenting opinions should have been expressed, heard
and evaluated. The failure of subordinate officers to
question the master's decision if inconsistent with RRPP
or otherwise in any way alarming would have constituted
what may be referred to as "destructive obedience," an
abdication of professional resp0nsibility involving
deliberate or slavish acquiescence to orders or practices
recognized as unsafe or contrary to standing orders or
procedures. Such destructive obedience was demonstrated
by the submarine USS Greeneville's OOD failing to
question the commanding officer's abbreviated surface
search by periscope minutes before the surfacing
submarine struck and sank the Japanese fishing training
vessel Ehime Maru. The anticipated sail by should have
been plotted against navigational hazards and a danger
zone determined, marked and avoided. All means available,
presumably numerous and functioning, for ascertaining the
vessel's position and progress should have been utilized
to maintain constant situational awareness at all three
levels: perception, comprehension and projection.
Certainly, as had been proven previously, a successful
sail by was possible to achieve, albeit with diminished
safety margins. The casualty occurring despite the
availability of technologically advanced navigational
equipment is likely to precipitate further discussion and
argument whether such equipment de-skills traditional
navigational knowledge and practice, a corollary to the
general belief that mariners are allowing technology to
do their thinking. Analysis of Costa Concordia AIS
information assessed from ashore suggests several
executory deficiencies. Costa Concordia appears to have
approached the island at an over the ground speed of 15.5
knots &endash; fast under the circumstances. While
maneuverability at speed is improved, a faster speed
compresses the time available for analysis and assessment
of the evolving situation &endash; especially critical
when the evolution is accompanied by stress, as would be
a relatively sudden decision to pass close by a rocky
island outside any marked channel. The degree of the
starboard turn to parallel the island and clear the
outcropping appears to have been made later than would
have been intended and certainly later than necessary for
safety. The danger, as the vessel proceeded parallel to
the island, presented by the rock appears to have been
recognized at the proverbial "last minute," as a turn to
starboard appears to have been initiated almost at the
rock, but with the ship's pivot point about one third the
ship's length abaft the bow and the momentum of her
forward motion, Costa Concordia still tended toward the
rock so a hard turn to port seems to have been started in
an effort to swing the midships and stern areas away from
the rock. Following contact, the ship
suffered a blackout, though how extensive is unclear.
Certainly emergency electrical power would be expected to
have kicked in. Propulsion and steering were lost or
minimized, thereby adversely affecting an initial attempt
to bring the ship closer to the port beyond the rock for
assistance. With the vessel's speed reduced to
less than three knots but with her heading taking her
away from land, the bow thruster was engaged to push the
bow to starboard so she was brought about and with wind
and current working on the vessel's starboard side she
was set down toward a sandy area where she grounded,
laying on her starboard side with an approximate 80
degree list. Certainly the event had an
immediate traumatic effect upon the command and
navigating team &endash; just how severe remains to be
seen. While much criticism has been directed relative to
post-strike decisions and behavior, not all relevant
information has come to light. At least for the moment,
perspective may be gained from considering the question
posed in Joseph Conrad's Lord Jim: "Do you know what you
would have done? Do you?" Overall, proper evaluation of the
vessel's handling and individuals' performance cannot
fairly be made until the "bounded reality" of Captain
Shettino and his navigating team is known. "Bounded
reality" refers to the notion that in decision making,
individuals' rationality is limited by the information
they possess and otherwise is available, the cognitive
restrictions of their minds relative to that information,
and the limited period of time available within which
decisions must be made. Once the bounded reality of the
personnel of Costa Concordia and other relevant
information is known, hopefully then informed decisions
may be made by politicians and regulators in a direction
to minimize maritime casualties. Law Offices of Countryman
& McDaniel Maritime
Books By Geoffrey W. Gill, Esq. Gill
On Admiralty
- Admiralty, 5th (Vols. 7-7A, West's® Federal
Forms) Copyright: 2009-2011
Service: 21.5 knots
(39.8 km/h; 24.7 mph) - Maximum: 23 knots
(43 km/h; 26 mph)
Michael
S. McDaniel
- Your Editor
Whatever one's point of view
may be, there appears unanimous agreement that the Friday
13 January 2012 casualty to the passenger liner Costa
Concordia will be an "industry changing event." Remaining
to be seen is the direction and magnitude of that change,
though the change can be expected to be significant in
view of other publicly notorious maritime casualties and
their consequences: Titanic, triggering the Saving of
Life at Sea convention; Herald of Free Enterprise,
triggering the International Safety Management Code and
concept of a maritime safety culture; Exxon Valdez,
triggering Oil Pollution Act 1990; and Erika, triggering
a European Union ban against single hull tankers, being
examples.
Geoffrey
Gill, Esq.
Senior litigation attorney
with career focus on maritime issues of Hull &
Machinery, Yachts, Cargo and Cruise Ships. He is an
experienced deck officer, Sailing Master of Unlimited
Tonnage and a graduate of the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy and
the U.S.
Naval War College.
Maritime
Error Management: Discussing and Remediating Factors
Contributory to Casualties
-
2012 Schiffer Publishing
An
experienced deck officer and maritime litigation
attorney objectively considers cognitive,
organizational, and operational factors proven to
contribute to maritime casualties. Research from
other safety-critical domains, as well as knowledge
gained from 40 years within the maritime industry,
inform this book. It provides a focused overview of
present day maritime safety issues and suggests
risk management strategies effective from the
wheelhouse as well as the board room. Subjects
covered include the evolution of the current
maritime safety philosophy, dealing with maritime
risk, bridge resource management, the nature of
error, situational awareness and decision making,
violations, technology and eNavigation, and
organizational management and failure in regards to
maritime risk. Unique to the book is the respect
for the interests of the mariner as well as the
interests of shore side management, interests
traditionally seen as conflicting.
The Luxurious Mega Cruise Ship
Larger Than Either RMS Titanic Or RMS Queen Mary
M/V Costa Concordia Is A Mega Complex Vessel
Massive Public Spaces
Multi-Level Show Room
Lavish Dining In A Grand Room
Private Dining
Esqusite Detail Marked M/V Costa Concordia
Lavish Public Spaces Aboard M/V Costa Concordia
Unparalleled Comfort From Which To Watch The Scenery Pass M//V Costa Concordia
Sports of All Kinds OnM//V Costa Concordia
Luxury In The Main Pool of M//V Costa Concordia - With Jumbotron Entertainment
The Spa Is King Size For M//V Costa Concordia
The Water Slide of M//V Costa Concordia -- Passengers Would Soon Experience A Dark Version of This Novedlty
January 13 2012 -- The Incident
M/V Costa Concordia Cabin Service Director, 57-year-old Manrico Giampetroni Welcomes Passengers To A Magical Cruise.
He Was Discovered In An Air Pocket In A Flooded Restaurant, 2 Days After The Incident.
He Was Winched To Safety With A Suspected Broken Leg,
The Passenger Dreams & Crew Aspirations Were Over -- The Capsize of M/V Costa Concordia Had Begun
All of This For A Publicity Stunt
Two Hours From Her Origin Port -- There Is Fear & Panic Among The Passengers
No Assistance From The Crew
From The Cargo Letter - Jan. 13 2012114,147-grt cruise ship M/V Costa Concordia (built 2006), with approximately 4,200 passengers and crew, ran aground and subsequently rolled onto its side off the Italian island of Giglio on Jan. 13. 15 people confirmed killed and an estimated 20 others are not accounted for. The vessel was sailing on a cruise across the Mediterranean Sea, starting from Civitavecchia with scheduled calls to Savona, Marseille, Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, Cagliari and Palermo. At 2030GMT, 2.5 hrs after leaving the port of Civitavecchia (near Rome), the vessel hit a rock as it sailed past the island of Giglio.As the vessel took on water, Capt Francesco Schettino attempted to turn the vessel towards the island. The vessel began listing severely to starboard. At 2110GMT, the abandon ship signal was given. There had not yet been an emergency drill. Some of the passengers and crew were forced to swim for land as the angle of the ship made boarding life boats impossible. Capt. Schettino said the rocks were not marked on maps and were not detected by navigation systems.
The ship's owners, Costa Cruises, said the Capt. had made an "unapproved, unauthorised" deviation in course, sailing too close to the island in order to show the ship to locals. Automatic tracking systems show the route of the Costa Concordia until it ran aground. The ship made the same journey through the strait on 6 January this year, but sailed much further from the island, according to positioning information provided by Lloyd's List. Investigators have located the "black box" system similar to those used by aircraft, that record voices on the bridge, as well as radar position and other data, which they hope will explain how the incident happened.
The Capt. is accused of, among other things, abandoning his ship prior to full evacuation. He and the first officer, Ciro Ambrosio, are being detained and are anticipated to be charged. In a profit warning on Jan. 16, Carnival -- parent company of Costa Cruises -- predicted the casualty will leave it between $85m and $95m short in the 2012 fiscal year. The Standard Club is the claims lead with the risk shared with Steamship Mutual on a quota share basis. The vessel's cover has a deductible of approximately $30m and the company has third party personal injury insurance with a $10m deductible. Loss of use is covered by the company itself. Several firms have been commissioned to assess salvage. [16/17/23-1-2012] Click here for futher coverage.
Life Rafts Had No Chance of Launching, As Some Passengers Were Forced To Climb Down 50 Foot Rope Ladders To Waiting Coast Guard Launches
Passenger Cabins Take A Vertical Plunge
Where The Rubber Meets The Road
Where M/V Costa Concordia Hit Isola del Giglio
This Is The Most Expensive Rock In World History Far More Expensive Than Either The Hope Diamond Or The Crown Jewels - This Rock May Cost Upwards of US$1Bn
Capt Francesco Schettino: The Most Currently Hated Man In Italy
Some Reports Call This Man "Chicken of The Sea"
Editor NoteFor our regular readers, you realize we are busy publishing the January edition of The Cargo Letter. When this major effort is concluded this week, we have many informative stories to relate to you for this epic loss of M/V Costa Concordia.
No humor is intended by the title of this feature. This is a tragedy.
McD
To Repeat -- No Matter How Careful You Are -- Or Who You Hire ....... "Ship Happens! ©"
Get Your "Ship Happens! ©" Gear!
Visit The Cargo Law Ship's Store For Great Industry Gift Ideas!
Visit The Cargo Law Ship's Store For Great Industry Gift Ideas!
Get Your "Ship Happens! ©" Shirts, Hats & Other Cool Gear!
The Dedication of This Feature Is Simple: To The Crew of M/V Costa Concordia, Her Passengers And Their Families.
SPECIAL NOTE: The historic dangers of carriage by air & sae continue to be quite real. Shippers must be encouraged to purchase high quality marine cargo insurance from their freight forwarder or customs broker.
It's very dangerous out there.
INDEX
TO OUR "Costa Lot"
PAGE SPECIAL
FEATURES:
Some of Our Fire At Sea Features:"Great Misfortune"- M/V Hyundai Fortune - March 2006M/T Vicuna Explodes - for Jan. 2005
"T-E-U Bar-Be-Cue" - aftermath of the M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania Loss - Nov. 2002
"Thar She Blows!" - M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania - Nov. 2002
"Meals: Ready To Explode" - Navy Barbecue at Guam June 2001
And ..... "Fighting Fires On Mars" - Jan. 2008Our Daily Vessel Casualties - stay informed
"Singles Only" - visit our individual moments of transport crisis for more.
The Greatest Container Losses Of All Time - these are the grand fathers -
M/V OOCL AmericaM/V APL Panama - The EPIC
"Great Misfortune"- M/V Hyundai Fortune - March 2006
SPECIAL NOTE: The historic dangers of carriage by sea continue to be quite real. Shippers must be encouraged to purchase high quality marine cargo insurance from their freight forwarder or customs broker.It's very dangerous out there.
Thanks To Our Contributors For The "Costa Lot" FeatureOur Contributor for this feature is:The Cargo Letter appreciates the continuing efforts of these valued contributors.
NOTE: Please Provide Us With Your Additional Information For This Loss.
EDITOR'S NOTE FOR SURVEYORS, ATTORNEYS & MARINE ADJUSTERS: The Internet edition effort of The Cargo Letter now celebrates it's 8th Year of Service -- making us quite senior in this segment of the industry. We once estimated container underway losses at about 1,500 per year. Lloyd's put that figure at about 10,000 earlier this year. Quite obviously, the reporting mechanism for these massive losses is not supported by the lines. News of these events is not posted to the maritime community. Our new project is to call upon you -- those handling the claims -- to let us know of each container loss at sea-- in confidentiality. Many of you survey on behalf of cargo interests with no need for confidentiality. Others work for the lines & need to be protected. As a respected Int'l publication, The Cargo Letter enjoys full press privileges & cannot be forced to disclose our sources of information. No successful attempt has ever been made. If a personal notation for your report is desired -- each contributor will be given a "hot link" to your company Website in each & every report. Please take moment & report your "overside" containers to us. If you do not wish attribution, your entry will be "anonymous." This will will benefit our industry -- for obvious reasons! McD
* NOTE: The Cargo Letter wants you to know that by keeping the identity of our contributors 100% Confidential, you are able to view our continuing series of "Cargo Disasters." Our friends send us materials which benefit the industry. The materials are provided to our news publication with complete and enforceable confidentiality for the sender. In turn, we provide these materials to you.
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The Cargo Letter Photo Gallery of Transport Loss - Items Below Are Only A Sample "Japan Tsunami: The Shore Ships of Sendai 'Part 2" - March 11 2011 "Japan Tsunami: The Shore Ships of Sendai" - Just Amazing - March 11 2011 "Premature Debark" - March 23 2011 "Japan Tsunami: Port of Sendai" - March 11 2011 "The Parcel Pool" - Toll Logistics Brisbane Floods - Mar. 2011 "Gear To Rail Fail" - MV Beluga Endurance - Jan. 2011 "Becoming The Tuna Can" - F/V Apollo S - Jan. 2011 "Plugging Up The Hooghly" - M/V Tiger Spring Jan. 8 2011 "Jork'd In The Open Ocean" - Oct. 21 2010 "How To Join Your Tuna" - Oct. 17 2010 "Discovery of The Black Pearl"- October 7 2010 "Haystack Hits Needle"- Sept. 18 2010 "Training For Disaster At Wild River" - August 29 2010 "Mumbai Departure" - M/V MSC Chitra - Aug. 2010 "Taken For Granite" - M/V Sophie Oldendorff July 4 2010 "Going Strait" - M/V Zhong Xing - June 2 2010 "Lost Horizons" - SSV Deep Horizon - April 29 2010 "Coaling On The Great Barrier Reef" - April 3 2010 "Poor Margaet, She's Just Blasted" - March 8 2010 "The Prisoners of Bothnia" - March 6 2010 "Getting Gil?" - M/V Ady Gil & High Seas Adventure - Feb. 7 2010 "Bear Eats Cub" - Jan. 30 2010 "Life & Death At Port -au-Prince" - Jan. 12 2010 "Royal Air Flight 988 Down - But Why?" - Jan. 5 2010 "Miracle At Kingston" - Dec. 31 2009 "Did You Hear That?" - Dec. 26 2009 "Star Crossed" - JDS Kurama - Dec. 1 2009 "General Motors Increases Training" - Nov. 28 2009 "Singapore Sling" - M/V MSC Kalina - Nov. 12 2009 "Road Warrior" - Important Moments In Transport History - Nov. 2009 "The Bridge On The River Shetrumji" - India Road Trip - Nov. 2009 "Make 25 Knots, Then Sit" - M/V Marko Polo - Nov. 2009 "Reefer Madness" - M/V Vega Gotland - Oct. 2009 "Meet Me At The Roundabout" - M/V MCS Nikita - Sept. 2009 "Auckward Straddle" - Sept. 2009 "Death of M/V Ioannis N.V." - August 2009 "Big Bunch 'O Black Barges - Beached" - Barge Margaret "Walvis Wollover" - June 2009 "Pacific Mis-Adventure" - May 2009 "MV Maersk Alabama - 206 Year Deja Vu" - April 2009 "The Retaking of M/V Maersk Alabama" - April 2009 "Miracle At Schiphol" - Flight TK 1951 - March. 2009 "Do Not Chill" - FedEx life with the ATR-42 - March. 2009 "Miracle On The Hudson" - Flight 1549 - Jan. 2009 "The Attack On M/V Zhen Hua 4" - Dec. 2008 "The Taking of MT Biscaglia" - Jan. 2009 "M/V Ciudad de Ushuaia Stuck At The Pole" - Dec. 2008 "The Taking of M/T Sirius Star" - Somalia Pirates Take Supertanker - Stakes Raised - Nov.- Jan. 2008 "Fedra Backs In" - Death of M/V Fedra" - Oct. 2008 "Tank You, From The Somali Pirates" - Somalia - M/V Faina - Sept.- Jan. 2009 "The Death of Hercules" - Nov. 2008 "JAXPORT Jumble" - August 2008 "Callsign Connie: 44 Tragic Days" - July 2008 "Too Little Runway - Too Much Plane" - TACA Flt 390 - June 2008 "Recurring Dream" - M/V Norwegian Dream - May 2008 "Paradise & Pirates" - S/V Le Ponant - April 2008 "The Light At The End of The Tunnel" - M/V Zhen Hua 10 & 23 - Mar. 2008 "Mess At Manzanillo" - M/V CMA CGM Dahlia - Mar. 2008 "Big Battered Banana Boat" - M/V Horncliff - Feb. 2008 "Back To The Beach" - M/V Riverdance - Feb. 2008 "Glider Operations At Heathrow" -- B-777 Crash - Jan. 2008 "Fighting Fires On Mars"- Martin Mars - Dec. 2007 "Steeplechase"- A340 - Nov. 2007 "Explorer Ship Down" - M/V Explorer - Nov. 2007 "Kwanyang Crane Kaboom" - Nov. 2007 "Den Den Done" - M/V Denden - Sept. 2007 "For The "L" of It" - M/V Action Alpha - August 2007 "Stack Attack!" - M/V Ital Florida - July 2007 "Pepito Flores Did Not Need To Die " - OUR INVESTIGATION RESULTS |
"Singles Only" -- Our One Photo Disasters These Are Only Examples "Riding Down The Marquis" - M/V Rickmars Dalian - June2007 "Carrying Coal To Newcastle" - M/V Pasha Bulker - June 2007 "Between A Yacht & A Hard Place" M/V Madame Butterfly - May 2007 "Boxing Up The Rhine" M/V Excelsior - April 2007 " "Crack'n On The Sidmouth" - M/V MSC Napoli - Jan. 2007 - Disaster In Real Time "Full Speed Ahead" - M/V Alva Star - Nov. 2006 "Where The Trade Winds Blew" - Oct. 2006 "Maersk Montevideo Melee!" - M/V Leda Maersk - Oct. 2006 "Laying Down On The Job" - M/V Cougar Ace -- Aug. 2006 -- Amazing ! "Vine Ripened Tires" - M/V Saga Spray -- May 2006 -- Amazing ! "Mis-Fortune" - M/V Hyundai Fortune - March 2006 "Scheldt Snafu!" - M/V Grande Nigeria - Feb. 2006 "A Day A The Beach - M/V APL Panama - Jan. 2006 - OUR EPIC COVERAGE "NO Rails" - destruction of New Orleans - Dec. 2005 "Backhaul !" - for July 2005 "The Boeing Tri-Motor" - for April 2005 "Catch of The Day" - for March 2005 "One Brick Short of A Runway" - for Jan. 2005 "Taichung Tumble" - May 2009 "World's Most Stupid Pirates" - May 2009 "LAX Lunch Deja Vu" - May 2009 M/T Vicuna Explodes - for Jan. 2005 "Unstacked" - overboard & Dr. Beach - Nov. 2004 "Coal Face" - the cargo was danger - July 2004 "Super Loss" - March 2004 "On A Wing & A Prayer" - Jan. 2004 "Stepping In It" - Dec. 2003 "Angel Fire" - Nov. 2003 "Broken Spirit" - M/V Tasman Spirit - Aug. 2003 "Denise & Polargo" - a love story - July 2003 "Columbia River Round Up" - June 2003 "Keel Hualed" - M/V Hual Europe - May 2003 "Thrice Bitten" -- M/V Tricolor - Jan. 2003 "Ramp-Age" - Feb. 2003 "Piñata" - breaking the box - Jan. 2003 "Halifax Hash"--M/V Maersk Carolina - Jan. 2003 "Thar She Blows!" - M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania - Nov. 2002 "T-E-U Bar-Be-Cue" - aftermath of M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania "Container Pool" - a mystery - May 2002 "Strangers On My Flight" -- by Frank Sinatra - don't blame us - we only report this stuff! "Dropping In On The Trucker" - it happened again - April 2002 "UNDER Achiever" - tell your friends ! - March 2002 Tell It To The U.S. Marines! - A Symbol of Our Day of Infamy - Sept. 11 Heavy Metal - lifting the un-liftable object - Disaster at Monrovia July 2001 Rail Mate -- an Egyptian rail loss - Tragedy At Ain Sokhna July 2001 Meals: Ready To Explode - Navy container barbecue at Guam! June 2001 America West Kisses Concrete M/V Ville De Orion - stack shift at LAX U.S. Navy EP- 3 -- China Hostage Situation - Spring 2001 Attack On USS Cole (DDG-67) - - Dramatic Photos! M/V OOCL America - Feb. 2000 M/V APL China - world's greatest container disaster - Nov. 1998 M/V New Carissa - the ship that would not die - 1999 M/V Tampa Maersk "on a dock diet" Hanjin's Bad Stab - Under The Dock At Pusan, Korea - Exclusive Photo! The Complete Cargo Letter Photo Gallery of Transport Loss
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